UP

Jesus: the One-natured God-man

January 29, 2014
Copyright © 1981, 1982, 2002 Ronald W. Leigh
Bible quotations are from the New International Version unless otherwise noted.

This paper was presented to the Evangelical Theological Society, Eastern Section, April 3, 1981,
then published in Christian Scholar's Review (volume XI, number 2), 1982.

Abstract: For fifteen centuries the prevailing view of the Christian church has been that Jesus Christ is one person with two natures.  This two-nature model is logically unacceptable, as is the concept of antinomy upon which it depends.  This paper offers an alternative, a one-nature model which assigns Jesus only one nature while simultaneously describing him as both God and man.  This one-nature model is in keeping with the doctrine of the imago Dei and with sound hermeneutical procedure.

A.  The consensus

When one affirms both the deity and the humanity of the Lord Jesus Christ, has one thereby demanded a two-natured Jesus?  In A.D. 451 the Council of Chalcedon affirmed Christ's deity and humanity by declaring that Jesus Christ is "truly God and truly man," and it went on to say that Christ is "recognized in TWO NATURES." ^l  Ever since then the church's answer to this question has been affirmative.

Protestant theologians have consistently maintained this two-nature model.  Luther declared, "We merge the two distinct natures into one single person, and say: God is man and man is God." ²  Calvin said of Christ that "the divinity was so conjoined and united with the humanity, that the entire properties of each nature remain entire, and yet the two natures constitute only one Christ." ³  Arminius described Jesus as "the Son of God and the son of man, consisting of two natures." ⁴  The Westminster Confession of Faith speaks of Christ as having "two whole, perfect, and distinct natures, the Godhead and the manhood." ⁵  A. B. Bruce says that "in Christ must be recognized two distinct natures, the divine and the human – the divine not converted into the human, the human not absorbed into the divine." ⁶  Strong says that "in the one person Jesus Christ there are two natures." ⁷  Chafer describes Christ as having "two distinct and dissimilar natures." ⁸  This sentiment is summarized tersely by Warfield: "No Two Natures, no Incarnation; no Incarnation, no Christianity." ⁹

B.  View and approach

In contrast to this overwhelming consensus, this paper presents the view that Jesus Christ had and has only one nature.  This is not a denial of the deity or of the humanity of Jesus.  This writer is fully convinced that the Bible, the written Word of God, clearly presents Jesus as both God and man.

The overall approach in this paper is to demonstrate both the incoherence of the two-nature model of the person of Christ and the coherence of the one-nature model.  The two-nature model contains a logical inconsistency which has created insurmountable problems for many centuries.  However, the one-nature model is much more in keeping with common notions about classification, with the doctrine of the imago Dei, and with sound hermeneutical procedure.  Thus, the plan of this paper is, first, to demonstrate the logical impossibility of the two-nature model; second, to survey certain historical views of Christ's nature(s) and the church councils' responses to them; third, to highlight the inappropriateness of the concept of antinomy as a justification of the two-nature model; fourth, to establish the appropriateness of speaking of a one-natured Jesus as both God and man; fifth, to point out the relevance of the doctrine of the imago Dei; and sixth, to draw attention to the significance of the theologian's hermeneutical procedure in dealing with the New Testament data.  This paper does not attempt to resolve any of the difficult questions about the incarnation process itself, such as the exact meaning of the "emptying" mentioned in Philippians 2:7, or the degree of Christ's intelligence and power during his infancy.

C.  The logical impossibility of the two-nature model

Throughout this discussion the words "individual" and "nature" retain their common meanings.  In keeping with standard usage, these two words are defined as follows:

An individual is an extant, single, indivisible entity.

Nature is the set of essential characteristics (qualities or attributes) of any given individual or class of individuals, that is, the set of characteristics which that individual must have in order to be included in its class.

Thus, every individual, by virtue of its existence, has its set of characteristics.  In other words, every individual has, or is of, a certain nature.  Also, no person can exist without a nature and no nature can exist apart from some individual that has that nature.

When two or more individuals have the same set of essential characteristics, those individuals can be grouped into the same classification because they have the same nature.  Thus, as shown in the following chart, it is possible for two individuals to have one nature, but one individual cannot have two natures.

Suppose that nearly all individuals have been classified according to their characteristics.  Then a unique individual is found whose one set of characteristics includes characteristics from two previously established classifications.  Even in such a case it would not be appropriate to say that that unique individual has two natures.  Every individual is what it is.  What it is, its nature, is its set of essential characteristics.  Certainly this unique individual has a set of characteristics which include characteristics not previously found together in a single individual. But that does not change the fact that it has one set rather than two sets of characteristics.

When such a unique individual is found, no problem need arise unless some of its characteristics are contrary to, or exclusive of, some of its other characteristics.  However, if it has been described in these mutually exclusive terms, the accuracy of that description should be questioned.  This fact makes it obvious that the problem of the two natures of Jesus is really a problem of two descriptions of Jesus.  One individual, having only one nature, needs only one description.

The fact that one individual cannot have two natures underlies the long-standing problem created by those who claim that Jesus Christ is one person with two natures.  Different approaches to the resolution of this problem have been advanced.  Some have explained away one of the "two natures" of Jesus, leaving him fully human but not quite divine, or fully divine but not quite human.

Some have welcomed such a problem in view of the fact that it appears to demand a unique Jesus.  After all, one might reason, Jesus is capable of the impossible, so he is capable of having two natures.  Indeed, Jesus is unique.  He is alone in his classification.  But it is not necessary to hold to a two-natured Jesus in order to have a unique Jesus.  His uniqueness can be easily maintained simply on the grounds that he is the only individual with the single set of characteristics which he has.

Also, some have attempted to deal with the problem of a two-natured Jesus by calling it an antinomy.  Later in this paper the very concept of antinomy will be shown to be inappropriate in biblical theology.  The presence of mutually exclusive characteristics in one's description of the nature of Jesus should not lead one to antinomy, but should lead one to seek a more accurate description.

D.  Past views and councils

The person of Christ has been a subject of lively debate throughout the history of the Christian church.  The concern here is not with those theological battles over the deity or the humanity of Christ.  Rather, assuming that both the deity and humanity of Christ are already established, the present concern is with those debates about the relationship between the divine and the human in the person of Christ.  At the Council of Nicea (A.D. 325), in response to the Arian controversy, the church pronounced its belief in both the deity and humanity of Jesus Christ.  But the details of that union of deity and humanity in one person remained in question and were much debated.  Various answers were given to the question, How is it possible that the one person, Jesus Christ, be simultaneously God and man?

Apollinaris the younger (310-392), whose view has been preserved in the writings of his critics, wanted to maintain the notion of the unity of the person of Christ.  Building on the view that man is composed of three parts – body, irrational soul, and rational soul (or intellect, or spirit) – Apollinaris contended that the divine Logos replaced the rational soul in Jesus.  Such a view was thought to deny the full humanity of Jesus since, according to this view, Jesus did not have a human intellect.  Critics of Apollinaris thought that, in order to end up with a person who fully qualifies as both God and man, the Son of God must have joined himself with that which was and remained fully human in its own right.  The Council of Constantinople (381) condemned Apollinaris's view.

Nestorius (d. 451), perhaps because his use of certain terms was misunderstood, has been blamed with holding the view that within the one person, Jesus, there were two quite dissimilar natures.  These two natures were so disparate that the divine in Jesus was said not to suffer when the human in Jesus did suffer.  Nestorius's followers (perhaps even Nestorius himself) held that Jesus was in fact two persons.  The Council of Ephesus (431) condemned Nestorius's extreme separation of the natures of Christ.

Cyril (d. 444) reasserted the unity of the two natures of Jesus Christ and the suffering of the divine in the body of Jesus.  Cyril also argued, in contrast to Apollinaris, that Christ's humanity was complete but that it had no independent subsistence.  That is, the divine person with his divine nature did not unite with a human person (who had, of course, a human nature).  Rather, the divine person with his divine nature united with a human nature resulting in one person, two natures.

Eutyches (c. 380-456), who claimed to follow Cyril, asserted that in Christ the two natures coalesced into one.  Some have taken this to mean that the divine and human in Jesus were so modified that Jesus was a tertium quid, neither truly divine nor truly human.  Even after the Council of Chalcedon (451) this view was continued by the Monophysites ("one nature") and the Monothelites ("one will").

The Council of Chalcedon (451) condemned the views of both Nestorius and Eutyches and upheld the view of Cyril when it pronounced:

We all with one accord teach men to acknowledge one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, at once complete in Godhead and complete in manhood, truly God and truly man ... recognized in TWO NATURES, WITHOUT CONFUSION, WITHOUT CHANGE, WITHOUT DIVISION, WITHOUT SEPARATION; the distinction of natures being in no way annulled by their union, but rather the characteristics of each nature being preserved and coming together to form one person and subsistence, not as parted or separated into two persons, but one and the same Son and Only-begotten God the Word, Lord Jesus Christ. ¹⁰

Luther's view of Christ tended toward the view of Eutyches in that he held to a mutual interpenetration of qualities, just short of a blending of the two natures.  Calvin's view is considered more in keeping with the definition of Chalcedon, although there are some who accuse him of tending toward Nestorianism.  Calvin stressed that the two natures of Christ are distinct, although not separate; the properties of the two natures coincide in the one person.

E.  The inappropriateness of the concepts of antinomy, paradox, and mystery

The prevailing view of the Christian church for more than fifteen centuries has been that Jesus Christ is one person with two natures.  In the light of the logical impossibility of such a view, some have appealed to the concepts of mystery, paradox, and antinomy in their attempt to maintain the two-nature model.  However, such concepts deserve critical examination because they impinge upon one of the requirements of truth, namely, compliance with the law of non-contradiction.

The concept of antinomy, for example, is at variance with the epistemology of evangelical theologians and apologists.  The word "antinomy" is used euphemistically to refer to a contradiction, and a contradiction, by whatever name it is called, is still unacceptable.  See the more complete discussion of this issue in the paper Mystery – a Caution: The Place of Mystery, Paradox, and Antinomy in Sound Biblical Theology.

Besides being not wanted, the concepts of antinomy, paradox, etc. are not needed because the New Testament data do not require them.  The New Testament never speaks of the nature of Jesus as an antinomy or a paradox.  Nor does it give any basis for an antinomy or paradox.  In other words, it does not say in one place that Jesus knew everything, while also saying in another place that Jesus did not know something. ²³

Furthermore, the New Testament never explicitly states that Jesus has two natures. The New Testament repeatedly refers to Jesus as God, and repeatedly refers to Jesus as man. ²⁴  However, to do so is not the same as explicitly saying that Jesus has two natures.  In other words, the notion or theory that Jesus has two natures is only one possible model which can be put forth as an explanation for the New Testament data.  The theologian who sets out to defend the two-nature model must realize that he is working with a model or a theory of previous theologians.  He is not working with an explicit statement of the Bible, as he would be if he were defending the fact that "Jesus Christ has come in the flesh" (1 John 4:2).

In short, the concepts of antinomy, paradox, and mystery are neither wanted nor needed.  They cannot be used as a justification for the two-nature model.  The two-nature model, rather than being an antinomy, is merely an inaccurate double-description of Christ.  The dilemma created by the New Testament data must be approached in a different way.

F.  The appropriateness of classifying a one-natured Jesus as both God and man

Can one individual, Jesus, have two natures?  When the question is asked in this way it must be answered negatively.  The definitions of "individual" and "nature," the inappropriateness of the concept of antinomy, and the lack of New Testament evidence lead to the suspicion that Jesus has only one nature.

Can one individual, Jesus, who has only one nature, be properly included in two classifications?  When the question is asked in this way it can be answered affirmatively.  After all, "most intellectual problems are, ultimately, problems of classification and nomenclature." ²⁵

It is easy to demonstrate that one individual can be properly included in two different classifications.

For example, consider the chair desk shown above. ²⁶  The chair desk is in two categories at once.

It is proper to include the chair desk in the classification "chairs" and to speak of it as a chair (a chair being any seat designed for one person, often having four legs and a back).  Also, it is proper to include it in the classification "desks" and to speak of it as a desk (a desk being any table, frame, or case with a sloping or horizontal surface for supporting reading or writing materials).

Of course, its most descriptive label is neither "chair" nor "desk," but "chair desk."  Thus, in a sense it is in a third classification.  However, if it is said that a third classification is formed, then it must be remembered that this third classification is formed through inclusion, not through exclusion.  In other words, this third classification is not a genuine tertium quid (literally, "a third something" by virtue of its exclusion from two other classifications).  A genuine tertium quid, given the classifications of desks and chairs, could be a pencil, or a glove, or a key. All of these items fail to fit into either of the two given classifications and thus each one forms a genuine tertium quid.  The difference with the chair desk is that it qualifies for both of the two given classifications.  Whatever characteristics are essential for an individual item to be properly called a chair, the chair desk has them.  Whatever characteristics are essential for an individual item to be properly called a desk, the chair desk has them.  That is, even though the chair desk has only one nature, it is truly a chair and at the same time is truly a desk.  Furthermore, the chair desk is properly included in the classification "chairs" even though it is not exactly identical to all other chairs, and is properly included in the classification "desks" even though it is not exactly identical to all other desks.  The characteristics which qualify it as a desk do not disqualify it from being a chair, and the characteristics which qualify it as a chair do not disqualify it from being a desk.

In order to draw upon this analogy more fully later, something else must be said about the chair desk.  Finding an individual which fits both of two given classifications is only possible when the two given classifications already have at least a minimal degree of similarity and thus have the potential for overlapping each other.  For example, it would seem to be impossible to find an individual item which fits both of these two classifications:  chairs and stockings.  Obviously, chairs and desks have more in common than do chairs and stockings, making a chair desk a possibility and a chair stocking an impossibility.  If one wanted to begin with a chair and make it into a stocking, one would have to make such basic alterations that it could no longer be properly called a chair.  However, if one wanted to begin with a chair and make it into a desk, one would not have to make basic alterations and it could end up being properly called both a chair and a desk – a chair desk.

Now consider Jesus Christ.  Jesus is in two classifications at once.  It is proper to include Jesus in the classification "deity" and to speak of him as God.  At the same time, it is proper to include him in the classification "humanity" and to speak of him as a man.  Of course, his most comprehensive label is neither "God" nor "man," but "God-man."  Thus, in a sense he is in a third classification.  However, if it is said that a third classification is formed, then it must be remembered that this third classification is formed through inclusion, not through exclusion. In other words, this third classification is not a genuine tertium quid since Jesus qualifies for both of the two given classifications.  Whatever characteristics are essential for a person to be properly called God, Jesus has them.  Whatever characteristics are essential for a person to be properly called a man, Jesus has them.  That is, even though Jesus has only one nature, he is truly divine and he is truly human.

In the beginning, the second person of the triune Godhead was divine but not human. The additions that were accomplished through the incarnation were sufficient to qualify him to be called human, but they were not sufficient to disqualify him from being called God.  Such additions were possible only because of the fact that the two given classifications, deity and humanity, already have a degree of similarity.  In other words, these two classifications are overlapping classifications.  It is at this point that the significance of the doctrine of the imago Dei, discussed in the next section, becomes obvious.

By the way, theologians have wrestled for centuries with this question:  What exactly was added to the second person of the trinity which resulted in his being human?  Many have answered this question by saying that Jesus must have combined a fully divine nature with a fully human nature, leading to the idea of two natures and requiring that he have both a divine spirit (or mind) and a human spirit (or mind).  We saw this line of thinking earlier when we discussed past views and councils.  Such reasoning follows the faulty pattern often used by philosophers in which they unnecessarily raise their level of discussion from the concrete to the abstract.  If, for example, the immediate subject is a tribesman's possession of 14 animals, the philosopher will tend to raise the level of discussion from animals to possessions, then to wealth in general.  Then, the philosopher will make various deductions on an abstract level about wealth and apply them to the tribesman and his animals – the resulting conclusions being very questionable.  When theologians examine the various characteristics of God and of humans, then talk about these natures as though they are separate entities that can be combined or blended or subsumed, they have followed the bad example of the philosophers by attempting to reason at an abstract level, and have blurred the distinction between an entity and a nature as we defined them earlier.

Now let's return to the question of what Jesus "added" during his incarnation.  We suggest that the Son, with the mere addition of a human body, has all the essential characteristics of humanity.  This view fits well with Christ's own statement regarding his incarnation, "a body you prepared for me" (Hebrews 10:5, italics added).  It also fits well with the statement that "since the children have flesh and blood, he too shared in their humanity" and was "made like his brothers"  (Hebrews 2:14-17, italics added).  It also fits well with Paul's statement that "He appeared in a body" (1 Timothy 3:16).

This view, that in the incarnation the Son merely added a body, was also expressed very early by Athanasius, a full century before the Council of Chalcedon.

He took to Himself a body, a human body even as our own. … He, the Mighty One, the Artificer [Maker] of all, Himself prepared this body in the virgin as a temple for Himself, and took it for His very own, as the instrument through which He was known and in which He dwelt. Thus, taking a body like our own, because all our bodies were liable to the corruption of death, He surrendered His body to death instead of all, and offered it to the Father. (Athanasius, On the Incarnation of the Word, section 8, found online at http://www.ccel.org)

You must understand, therefore, that when writers on this sacred theme speak of Him as eating and drinking and being born, they mean that the body, as a body, was born and sustained with the food proper to its nature; while God the Word, Who was united with it, was at the same time ordering the universe and revealing Himself through His bodily acts as not man only but God. Those acts are rightly said to be His acts, because the body which did them did indeed belong to Him and none other; moreover, it was right that they should be thus attributed to Him as Man, in order to show that His body was a real one and not merely an appearance. From such ordinary acts as being born and taking food, He was recognized as being actually present in the body; but by the extraordinary acts which He did through the body He proved Himself to be the Son of God. (Athanasius, loc. cit., section 18)

(By the way, at the end of the first quotation above Athanasius talks as though the physical death of Christ is the death wherein he took our place.  In reality, it is Christ's spiritual death wherein he served as our substitute.  See the papers The Substitutionary Death of Christ and The Two Deaths of Christ.)

G.  The relevance of the doctrine of the Imago Dei

It is well beyond the scope of this paper to attempt to describe the image of God in man.  Nevertheless, this much can be said: God and man are similar in some way, and that similarity between God and man must lie in the area of the person (the non-material, self-conscious, rational, emotive, and volitional soul or spirit of man) rather than in the body of man.  This similarity is the first thing Moses said about man in his account of man's creation in Genesis 1:26-27.  The significance of Moses' statement is even more striking when one notices that this reference to similarity is in the context of a discussion of "kinds" or classifications.  All of the previous life forms are said to have been created and to reproduce according to their kind, but man is said to be of the God-kind. In other words, deity overlaps humanity.

This doctrine of the imago Dei is a missing element in many of the historical discussions of the nature of Christ.  Its absence indicates that the differences between the historical versions of the two-nature model cited above and the one-nature model presented in this paper are more than mere semantic differences. ²⁷  The two-nature model does not require the doctrine of the imago Dei; the one-nature model does.  This similarity between God and man is the key which makes possible the single nature of Jesus, yet the dual classification.  Richardson identifies the doctrine of the imago Dei as relevant to any discussion of the incarnation.

The first and most obvious criticism of the Chalcedonian theologians arises from the fact that they were inclined to set too great a gulf between God and man.  They tended to conceive of God and man as two substances differing from each other in kind and having no properties in common.  Of course we can now see that this tendency of their thought was principally due to the accommodation of their thinking to the current philosophy of their day. ...  If a real incarnation has taken place at all, this means that God and man cannot be absolutely dissimilar in essence, since they have been brought together in the one Person of Jesus Christ.  Wholly dissimilar substances can never be brought together in such a way that a real, organic union is effected.  That is why the Arians were forced to deny the incarnation by making the Son a creature; they had already removed God so far from man.  If God was incarnate in Jesus Christ, there must be that in man which is fundamentally capable of being united with Deity.

Thus, in tending to look upon God and man as two different substances, distinct in kind, the Chalcedonians made the problem of an incarnation more difficult than it really is.  If there is a great abyss between God and man, a doctrine of incarnation will be hard put to it to bridge it satisfactorily; but if, on the other hand, God and man are fundamentally akin, as is surely implied by the belief that man was made in the image of God, then the problem as to how God may be incarnate in human life ceases to be an insoluble puzzle.  The doctrine of the incarnation then is seen to mean that God is very near to man, not far away, as the Greeks supposed. ²⁸

Buswell concurs:

The fact that there is this God-related element in all men ... should be sufficient evidence to show that the incarnation is not contradictory.  We do not claim that a square became a circle, or that any being assumed a nature contradictory to his own, but that the Son of God took a complex of attributes already patterned after His own image and compatible with His own complex of divine attributes. ²⁹

Thus, the doctrine of the imago Dei affirms the essential similarity between God and man.  As noted above, an individual can be legitimately placed in a certain classification on the basis of its essential characteristics and does not have to be exactly identical in all aspects to all other individuals in that classification.  Thus, it is fitting to conclude that Jesus was like the Father in areas essential to deity but unlike the Father in some areas nonessential to deity, and like fallen man in areas essential to humanity but unlike fallen man in some areas nonessential to humanity (see the following chart).  This preserves the notion that the members of the Trinity are one in essence.

The same comparison can be made in more graphic form with the use of a Venn diagram:

H.  The theological-hermeneutical procedure

As cited above, Jesus is often described twice, and these double-descriptions are often stated in mutually contradictory terms.  This is supposedly justified by assigning some of his characteristics to his divine nature and others to his human nature.  For example, Jesus is said to be omniscient in his divine nature, while not omniscient in his human nature.  Kuyper displays this same bifurcation when, after repeated mention of Jesus' divine nature and human nature, he says that

His human knowledge had no free access to His divine knowledge.  (Abraham Kuyper, The Work of the Holy Spirit, Funk & Wagnalls, 1900, p. 95)

But there is a faulty theological-hermeneutical procedure behind this faulty description.  The correct procedure would include at least these two steps:

1. First, noting all the New Testament statements about Jesus, including those which call him God and those which describe his specific abilities and actions.
2. Second, correlating and integrating these New Testament data and formulating a view of the nature of Jesus based on all the data.

In contrast, the procedure which appears to lie behind the traditional two-nature analysis of the characteristics of Jesus is:

1. First, noting the New Testament statements which call Jesus God.
2. Second, adopting a predetermined idea of the nature of God and therefore a certain nature for Jesus.
3. Third, noting the New Testament statements which describe Jesus' specific abilities and actions.

Bruce refers to the middle step when he says that "everyone who would form for himself a conception of the person of Christ must first determine his idea of God, and then bring that idea to his Christological task as one of its determining factors." ³⁰  But it is this middle step which appears to underlie the dilemma.  After all, what divine nature shall one adopt for Jesus?  One should not assume that, in order to be God, Jesus must be exactly like the Father or exactly like the collective Old Testament descriptions of God (just as one should not limit one's concept of a chair to that which a typical chair is).  Furthermore, it seems clear that part of the Son's mission was to supply concrete information about the Father (John 1:18, 14:7-9).  Thus, the proper procedure seems to be to build our picture of Jesus and at least part of our picture of the Father on the New Testament description of Jesus.  This is just the opposite of the procedure recommended by Bruce.

As stated above, Jesus was neither exactly like the Father in all aspects, nor exactly like other men in all aspects.  Thus, in order to describe the characteristics of Jesus accurately we must base our description on the explicit New Testament statements of the characteristics of Jesus rather than on some assumed content of the concept "God."

Notice that the Gospel writers clearly say both that Jesus is God and that he was ignorant of the timing of his own return.  They say this without any apology for the "contradiction" involved.  Evidently in their minds there was no contradiction.  Nor do they claim that it is Jesus' possession of two natures which allows them to say this.  If the New Testament writers, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, are willing to say that this one divine person, Jesus, has as part of his nature (one of his characteristics) ignorance of the timing of his return, then it seems improper to assume that in order to be God one must know everything. ³¹  To make that assumption would be like saying that, since one chair with which we are familiar has arm rests, all chairs must have arm rests or else they do not qualify as chairs.

In short, not only must we let the New Testament description of Jesus speak for itself, unhindered by previously fixed ideas about the nature of God and of man, but we must also let the picture of Jesus given in the New Testament help determine our understanding of the nature of God and of man.  On the divine side, the passages which describe Jesus' abilities must be taken into account early in the procedure so that they can shape our understanding of what characteristics are essential to deity.  Likewise, on the human side, we must be careful not to finalize our definition of the essential nature of man until we have considered the New Testament description of Jesus.  For example, one might conclude (based solely on the biblical account of man's creation) that, in order to be properly classified as a man, a person must have a created spirit.  However the New Testament's classification of Jesus as a man makes such a conclusion premature.  The nature of Jesus is determinative for our understanding of the essence of the nature of man, as well as for our understanding of the essence of the nature of God. 

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Endnotes

^l Henry Bettenson, ed., Documents of the Christian Church (2d ed., London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 73, capitals in Bettenson.

² Martin Luther, Word and Sacrament (Vol. III; in Luther's Works, Vol. 37, ed. Helmut T. Lehmann; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1961), p. 212, italics added.

³ John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion (trans. Henry Beveridge; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1957), II, 14, 1, italics added.

⁴ The Writings of James Arminius (trans. Nichols & Bagnall; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1956), Disputation 34, 2:84, italics added.

⁵ Westminster Confession of Faith, VIII, 2, italics added.

⁶ A. B. Bruce, The Humiliation of Christ (4th ed., Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1955), p. 63, italics added.

⁷ Augustus H. Strong, Systematic Theology (Westwood, N.J.: Revell, 1907), p. 673, italics added.

⁸ Lewis S. Chafer, Systematic Theology (Dallas: Dallas Seminary Press, 1947), 1:382, italics added.

⁹ B. B. Warfield, The Person and Work of Christ (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1950), p. 211.

¹⁰ Bettenson, p. 73, capitals in Bettenson.

¹¹ J. I. Packer, Evangelism and the Sovereignty of God (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1961), pp. 18-21, italics in the original.

¹² Loraine Boettner, Studies in Theology (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1947), p. 197.

¹³ L. Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1938), p. 309.

¹⁴ Berkhof, p. 315.

¹⁵ Chafer, 1:391-392.

¹⁶ Chafer, 1:391.

¹⁷ Strong, p. 693.

¹⁸ Bettenson, p. 64.

¹⁹ Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology (1871; reprinted Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1970), 1:51-52.

²⁰ E. J. Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics (4th. ed., Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1952), p. 56, italics in the original.

²¹ James O. Buswell, A Systematic Theology of the Christian Religion (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1962), 1:22.

²² Paul Little, Know Why You Believe (2d ed., Wheaton, Ill.: Victor Books, 1967), p. 132.

²³ Jesus himself indicates that he did not know the timing of his own return (Matthew 24:36;  Mark 13:32).  However, the New Testament never says that Jesus knew everything.  Although Peter's statement about Jesus, "You know all things" (John 21:17), is inspired in the sense that it is a reliable record of what Peter said, it is not necessarily an inspired statement in itself.  Even if it is an inspired statement in itself, it can be considered to be a generalization while Jesus' own statements on the subject provide the exception to the generalization (similar to the generalizations that no one is righteous, except Jesus).  Other passages such as Mark 2:8 and John 2:24-25 may indicate superhuman knowledge, but superhuman knowledge is not the same as omniscience.  Colossians 2:3 is probably an indication of the believer's fullness of wisdom and knowledge in Christ, rather than an indication of Christ's omniscience.

²⁴ For example see John 1:1, 18;  5:18;  17:5, 24;  20:28;  2 Thessalonians 1:12;  1 Timothy 3:16;  Titus 2:13;  2 Peter 1:1 regarding the deity of Christ, and John 1:14;  Galatians 4:4;  Hebrews 2:9, 17;  4:15;  5:7-8;  12:2 regarding the humanity of Christ.

²⁵ S. I. Hayakawa, Language in Thought and Action (2d ed., New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1963-64), p. 220.

²⁶ The chair desk (also known as a tablet arm chair) is a straight chair with writing tablet attached.  It is chosen as an example here because it is found in many school classrooms.  However, other entities could just as easily be chosen to illustrate the point.  There are many micro-organisms which are subject to dual classification.  One such organism is the Euglena, a genus of single-celled organisms, which, because of its unique set of characteristics, is classified both as plant and as animal.  (In botany it is classified as a genus in the phylum Euglenophyta; in zoology it is classified as a genus in the phylum Protozoa).  In addition, certain hybrids could serve as illustrations.  Also consider the three monotremes – the duck-billed platypus, the long-nosed echidna, and the short-nosed echidna (the latter two are also called spiny anteaters).  All three can be classified both as reptiles and as mammals.  They lay eggs that are similar to other reptiles' eggs (large yolks and rubbery shells) and have many other reptilian characteristics including their urogenital organs and their skeletons.  They also have mammalian characteristics such as mammary glands, hair, large brains, and complete diaphragms.  The use of light as an example (since light behaves variously as a wave or particle) is questionable because of our presently limited knowledge about light.

²⁷ It should also be noted that this one-nature model differs from historic monophysitism.  Of course, monophysitism is a general term which covers a variety of historical views that existed both concurrently with and following Chalcedon, and for that reason it may be somewhat inaccurate to deal with all these views under one label.  Nevertheless, three general areas of contrast should be noted.  First, historic monophysitism does not require as a prerequisite the doctrine of the imago Dei.  It begins with the notion that humanity and deity are necessarily incompatible.  The essence of the  historical monophysite views was that Christ had one nature which came from a blending of two disparate natures.  Although this paper presents the view that Christ has one nature, this view is not to be mistaken for historic monophysitism.  Indeed, the heart of the paper, especially the section on the relevance of the doctrine of the imago Dei, emphasizes the concept that human nature and divine nature are not disparate or mutually exclusive to begin with.  Thus, this view of the nature of Christ is in some ways just the opposite of the historic monophysite view.  Second, historic monophysitism requires an alteration either in the divine or the human nature, or both, in order to achieve unity in the person of Jesus.  Usually it opted for a larger change in the humanity than in the deity.  This resulted in many cases in a tertium quid, in contrast to the view presented herein.  Also, this resulted historically in the view on the part of some that Jesus' body was essentially different from the bodies of other men, again in contrast to my own views.  Third, historic monophysitism constantly talks of a fusion, mingling, or coalescing of natures in Christ.  In contrast, my essay focuses on the problem of applying the labels of deity and humanity to this one person, Jesus Christ.

²⁸ Alan Richardson, Creeds in the Making (London: SCM Press, 1935), pp. 87-89.  Richardson, however, goes on to equate perfect manhood with incarnate deity, which would seem to require either that Adam be God or that Adam be created imperfect.

²⁹ Buswell, 2:20.

³⁰ Bruce, p. 10. In the context of this quotation Bruce is discussing the larger issue of the objective existence of God as a personal and moral trinity in contrast to a pantheistic god or a God who is limited to the mind of man.  Thus, Bruce's point is well taken when applied to the mere question of the possibility of Jesus being more than human.  Nevertheless, the basic methodology recommended by Bruce cannot be extended to the details of the nature of Jesus as though his specific characteristics can be predetermined according to one's assumed view of the Father.

³¹ It should also be noted that Matthew 24:36 and Mark 13:32 imply that the Holy Spirit did not know the time of Jesus' return.  (See also Acts 1:7 where the omission of the Holy Spirit is especially significant in view of his inclusion in the next clause.)  This is in keeping with the notion that it may not be necessary to be omniscient in order to be God.  Furthermore, it shows that the ignorance of Jesus about the timing of his return is not necessarily a result of the incarnation since the Holy Spirit appears to have the same limitation without an incarnation.